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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR: LEGAL DEFINITION
OF RELIGION AND FIRST AMENDMENT
GOVERNMENTAL NEUTRALITY
THOMAS A. MARTIN

The United States, throughout its historical development, has considered itself progressively aware of religious freedoms for its citizens.'
These concepts of religious freedom first crystallized within the foundation of our system of democratic government when the Constitution
was drafted to include a separation of Church and State. The establishment of religion clause of the first amendment has been considered a
progressively unique political tenet of the United States Government,
and it has consequently afforded a comparatively high degree of religious freedom for its citizenry. 2 The concept of religious freedom is
preserved by an avowed governmental neutrality in religious activities,
as required by the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment.3 The first amendment, though perhaps deemed self-evident, has created a wide vista of judicial interpretation in reconciling
the Government's and citizens' standpoints of view. This particularly
comes to focus when the issues are keyed to the meaning of that elusive
word: "Religion."
This comment will discuss the legal definition of "religion," in relation to draft exemption for the conscientious objector, by tracing the
1 See Brodie and Southerland, Conscience, The Constitution, and The Supreme Court:
The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306 (1966).
2 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511, 9 L. Ed. 711, 723
(1947), stating that:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1571, 10 L. Ed.
2d 844, 858 (1963), Justice Clark stated:
[T]he Establishment clause . . . withdrew all legislative power respecting religious
belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement
or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution.
8 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-223, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1572, 10
L. Ed. 2d 844, 858 (1963), where the Court held:
The Free Exercise Clause . . . . withdraws from legislative power . . . the exertion

of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by the civil authority.
Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of
the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.
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judicial evolution of the concept from its initial stages to its present
position and possible future.4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTOR

CONCEPT

The historical status of religion and its relation to the conscientious
objector is best illustrated by the various federal statutes and corresponding judicial holdings. 5 The first exemption was enacted in 18690
and essentially provided exemption for members of religious denominations who by oath or affirmation declared that they were conscientiously
opposed to the bearing of'arms and that they were prohibited from
doing so by the rules and articles of faith and of practice of their said
religious denominations. 7
The courts interpreted the general meaning of religion to embody
a construction involving "one's views of his relations to his Creator,
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His being and

character, and of obedience to His will." This judicial interpretation
of religion revolving around a belief in a deity (premised on membership in a known Church) met with little opposition.9
In 1917 Congress, through the Draft Act of 1917,10 enacted the first
comprehensive national conscription law, dropping the commutation
provisions." This Act clarified the meaning of religion in relation to
conscientious objectors. The statute provided exemption as follows:
...nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or
compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided
for who is found to be a member of any well-recognized religious
sect or organization at present organized and existing whose creed
or principle forbid its members to participate in war in any form
and whose religious convictions are against war or participation
therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious
organizations ....12
4 For a discussion of other religious freedoms, see Galanter, Religious Freedoms in The
United States: A Turning Point?, 66 Wis. L. REv. 327 (1966).
5 See 2 Selective Service System, Special Monograph No. 11, Backgrounds of Selective
Service (1947).
6 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, Ch. 13 § 17.
7 Also included in the statute were provisions for qualificants to pay a commutation
fee of 300 dollars in lieu of serving.
8 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S. Ct. 299, 300, 33 L. Ed. 637, 639 (1890).
9 Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457, 512 (1881):
As to the word "religion" used in connection with "learning and charity," if it can
be given effect without violating any principle of existing law, it is our duty to give
it such effect .... In its primary sense . . . it imports, as applied to moral questions,
only a recognition of a conscientious duty to recall and obey restraining principles
of conduct. In such a sense we suppose there is no atheist who will admit that he
is without religion.
10 Act of May 18, 1917, Ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
11 Supra, note 7.
1240 Stat. 78 (1917).
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The only major attack upon the statute came in 1918 when, in the
Selective Draft Cases,ia the congressional power to compel military
service from all citizens was upheld.14 The congressional intent, requiring a belief in a deity and the favoring of those persons being members
of recognized religious sects went unchallenged until, the Department
of War, itself, realized the narrow scope of the statute and in 1919
broadened the exemption by excluding the requirement that one must
belong to a pacifist sect or a peace church.
The Secretary of War directs that until further instructions on the
subject are issued "personal scruples against war" shall be considered as constituting "conscientious objection" and such persons
should be treated in the same manner as other "conscientious
objectors. ....-15
The question of belief in a deity was preserved in accordance with
congressional intent in the famous Macintosh'6 case where the issue
over the powers of Congress in relation to the individual and his personal religious scruples was finalized when the Court held:
... that whether any citizen shall be exempt from serving in the
armed forces of the nation in time of war is dependent upon the
the scruples of the individual,
will of Congress and not upon
7
provides.'
Congress
as
except
The conscription statute was repealed in 1935,18 and it was not until
1940 that it was proposed and adopted again in the form of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.19 Many proposals were offered
to expand the 1940 bill over the previous 1917 law20 in hopes of broadening the exemption. The American Civil Liberties Union attempted
to have the bill contain a provision exempting "those conscientiously
opposed to war in any form. 12 1 An equally sympathetic group, the Society of Friends, proposed to exempt one "who by reason of religious
training and belief is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
13 245 U.S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349 (1918). See also Black, The Selective Draft

Law Cases-A Judicial Milepost on The Road to Absolutism, 11 Bos. L. Rav. 37 (1931).
14 Id.
15 U.S. Dep't of War, Statement Concerning the Treatment of Conscientious Objectors in the Army, 39 (1919).
16 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
17 Id. at 634, 51 S. Ct. at 574, 74 L. Ed. at 1309. The Court also said: "The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with
the policy of Congress thus to relieve him."
1840 Stat. 76 (1917), repealed by 49 Stat. 878 (1935).
19 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
20 For a good discussion of these proposals see Conklin, Conscientious Objection Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252 (1963).
21 See Hearing on the H.R. 10132 Before the House Committee on Military Affliairs,
73d Cong., 3d Sess. 191 (1940).
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any form."'22 Congress accepted the latter group's proposals and adopted
the act to read:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.23

It is at this stage of conscientious objector development that the
courts of the United States took divergent views of the meaning of
religion. 24 The phrase "who by reason of religious training and belief ' '25 proved too broad and nebulous to allow cohesive interpretations.
The split was first effected in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Kauten,2 6 where a liberal meaning of religion was
espoused by Justice Augustus Hand:
It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the content
of the term is found in the history of the human race and is incapable of compression into a few words. Religious belief arises
from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating
the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe-a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized
societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it.
It is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically
requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to
accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets. 2 7

Various cases followed Hand's dicta and in United States ex rel. Phillips
v. Downer,28 the Second Circuit found the petitioner's beliefs to be sincerely in opposition to war although he could not specifically say from
whom these beliefs were derived.29 The idea of an "inward mentor,
call it conscience or God ' 30 becoming the basis of a conscientious objector exemption could not be sustained by the Ninth Circuit decision in
United States v. Berman,s ' when the court held:
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious training and belief" is plain language, and was written into the statute
22 Id. at 211.
23 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885 § 5(g).

24 See Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace,
54 U. VA. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (1968).
25 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, § 5(g).
26 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
27 Id. at 708.
28 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).

29 Id. at 523; see also United States ex tel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
30 United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 523 (2d Cir. 1943).
a' 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795, 67 S. Ct. 480, 91 L. Ed. 680
(1946).
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for the specific purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious
social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philosophy,
and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to
an authority higher and beyond any worldly one. 32
The following from the Berman case cements the Ninth Circuit's view
of the meaning of religion regarding conscientious objectors:
However, no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be,
and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and
morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be
said to be religion in the sense of that term as it is used'in the
statute. 83
The question of congressional intent and the meaning of the phrase
was theoretically solved in 1948 with an amendment to the Selective
Service Act.3 4 "By reason of religious training and belief" was explained
to mean:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relationship, but does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code. 35
This amended clarification should have united the courts to adjudicate their cases following congressional intent, thereby resolving any
circuit problems. This, however, was not the case when the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the statute's validity and declared it
to be unconstitutional. 6 The court concluded that there were grave
constitutional issues raised by the 1948 Act. Those persons who claimed
no religious belief or one that they could not identify with the standard
concept of a deity, would be denied equal status with those who claimed
a religious belief or could relate some belief to a theistic concept.
A serious conflict thus arose in that the Supreme Court in 1961 had
37
addressed itself to the neutrality of the State in religious affairs:
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946).
Id. at 381.
34 Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
85 Id. at § 6(j).
36 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 854 (1964). The court stated:
While we are therefore most reluctant to find that Congress, in a sincere attempt
to balance the personal rights of a minority with the insistent demands of our
national security, has transgressed the limits imposed by the Constitution, we are
compelled so to hold.
See United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), for a prior holding of
the court on this point.
37 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S. Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1961).
32

83
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We repeat again and reaffirm that neither a state nor the federal
government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers; and neither can aid those religions based on a belief
in the existence of God as against those religions founded on dif38
ferent beliefs.
Through the conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court was faced squarely with the constitutionality of the statute.
There was a problem of a possible first and fifth amendment conflict
with the statute due to its requirement of belief in a deity.39 The Court
consolidated the Jakobson and Seeger cases in conjunction with the
Peter case 40 and attempted to resolve the conflict. 4 '

Jakobson was of the humanist school; his beliefs flowed not vertically,
rather, horizontally towards his fellow man. 42 His beliefs fell in line
with a concept of theism and the Court stated that his beliefs fell within
the meaning of religion as defined by statute. 43 The Supreme Court
44
therefore affirmed the court of appeals decision.
Peter was convicted for failure to report for induction and his conviction was upheld 45 although the Court found that Peter, who could
not relate directly to a belief in a Supreme Being, was entitled to
exemption. 46 Seeger presented a more difficult question for the Court
under the statute, but rather by attacking
by not claiming protection
47
its constitutionality.
38 Id. at 495, 81 S. Ct. at 1693, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 987.
39 See Everson at note 2 supra and Schenipp at note 3 supra.
40 Peter v. United States, 324 F2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).
41 See also Brodie and Southerland, Conscience, The Constitution, and the Supreme
Court: The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 66 Wis. L. REV. 306 (1966).
42 United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir. 1963). The court stated:
The way to arrive closer to Godness is by approaching the universals inherent in
existence. The individual must deal with life, death, love, time-the "givens" of
existence stemming from the Ultimate Cause-as he finds them in himself and others.
48 380 U.S. 163, 165, 85 S. Ct. 850, 854, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733, 736 (1965). The Court stated:
"Jakobson claims he meets the standards of Section 6(j) because his opposition to war
is based on belief in a Supreme Reality and is therefore an obligation superior to one
resulting from man's relationship to his fellow man."
44 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965).
45 Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).
46 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 189, 85 S. St. 850, 865, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733, 749
(1965). The Court stated:
It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged "some -power manifest in nature
. . . the supreme expression" that helps man in ordering his life. As to whether he
would call that belief in a Supreme Being he replied, "You could call that a belief
in a Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use."
47 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964). The court stated:
Seeger asserts that the "Supreme Being" requirement, as applied to him constitutes
a law respecting an establishment of religion, within the meaning of the First
Amendent, and an arbitrary classification, violative of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
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Seeger's claim of exemption as a conscientious objector fell short of
complying with the requisites for conscientious objector status because
his beliefs were not based on a concept of religion in relation to a
recognized deity. The Court held:
Refusing to assert a simple belief or disbelief in a deity, Seeger felt
compelled to express his convictions in more extensive terms. In
a statement attached to the questionnaire, he explained his feelings that "the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven, and
the existence of His nature cannot be determined. I prefer to admit
48
this and leave the question open rather than answer yes or no."
The Court in hearing Seeger anticipated the far-reaching constitutional problems inherent in his religious (non-religious) views; and,
rather inarticulately, through a post-judicial reinterpretation of leading
court decisions, 49 declared the issue to rest not on the constitutional
question; but, rather on whether Seeger's beliefs were simply made up
of a personal moral code and if so, whether they fell within the meaning of the exemption. To prevent invalidation of the statute, the real
issue was skirted and altered by the Court making clear its intention
of not considering or determining the status of the non-religious conscientious objector.
We also pause to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this
ground. The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and
atheistic beliefs. We do not deal with or intimate any decision on
that situation in these cases. 50
The Court continued:
Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: does the term "Supreme
Being" as used in Section 6(j) mean the orthodox God or the
broader concept, a power or being, or a faith, "to which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent?" 5'
The Court then analyzed Seeger's personal moral convictions and
concluded by adopting the holding of the court of appeals:
When Daniel Seeger insists that he is obeying the dictates of his
conscience or the imperatives of an absolute morality, it would
seem impossible to say with assurance that he is not bowing to
48 Id. at 848.
49 For a discussion of these leading decisions see Rabin, When is a Religious Belief

Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L. REV.
231, 239 (1966).
50 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173, 85 S. Ct. 850, 858, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733, 741
(1965).
51 Id. at 174, 85 S. Ct. at 858, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 741 (1965).
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"external commands" in virtually the same sense as is the objector
who defers to the will of a supernatural power. 2
To lay the problem at rest the Court then devised its oft-quoted test for
the benefit of the lower courts who would have to make a similar
determination in situations like Seeger:
The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.5 3
Thus, Seeger's religious or non-religious convictions made no difference. The Court held that sincere beliefs occupied in his mind the
same position that religious beliefs occupied in the mind of a theistic
conscientious objector and that these sincere beliefs fell within the
meaning of religion. This became the broadest and most liberal interpretation of the religious attributes a registrant must possess to fulfill
the requirements of conscientious objector status. Although the decision
was a strained one, 54 the Court had successfully avoided striking the
statute down as unconstitutional. With the Seeger decision, the meaning of religion and conscientious objector took an expanded step laterally giving once narrow views new light and freedom.5 5 The lower
courts could view Seeger in an equally expansive light thus allowing
them new guidelines not permissible previously. 56
PRESENT STATUS

OF RELIGION

AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTOR

The question of non-religious conscientious objectors still stands
unanswered by any Supreme Court decision. The lower courts seem
to have met the problem head-on. United States v. Sisson,57 offers
a clear example of a new and turning trend within the judiciary
regarding religion and the conscientious objector. John Sisson was
prosecuted in Federal District Court (Mass.) for refusing to submit to
52 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
53 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 85 S. Ct. 850, 859, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733, 743
(1965).
54 See Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the
Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1966); Brodie and Southerland, Conscience, The Constitution, and the Supreme Court: The Riddle of the United States v.
Seeger, 66 Wis. L. REv. 327 (1966).
55 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965).
56 Id. at 184, 85 S. Ct. at 863, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 747, where the Court held:
In such an intense personal area . . . the claim of the registrant that his belief is
an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight. . . . The validity
of what he believes cannot be questioned ....
Local boards and courts in this sense
are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them "incomprehensible." Their
task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and
whether they are in his own scheme of things, religious.
57294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
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induction in violation of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.58
The varied points in issue were disposed of by the district court in three
separate opinions, 59 with the court refining the case to its constitutional
questions in its fourth and final opinion. 6
Sisson attacked section 6(j) of the 1967 Act 6 ' on the grounds that,
as it applied to his being a non-religious conscientious objector, the
Act violated the free exercise clause and the establishment of religion
clause of the first amendment and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 62 Chief Judge Wyzanski agreed with Sisson's argument
and stated:
In short, in the draft act Congress unconstitutionally discriminated
against atheists, agnostics, and men, like Sisson, who, whether they
be religious or not, are motivated in their objection to the draft
by profound moral beliefs which constitute the central convictions
of their beings. 63

The court's reasoning pivoted on the rulings of the often cited cases
that soundly profess "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab64
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Sisson's beliefs, not in the formal sense religious, were viewed by
this court as genuine and persuasive:
...Sisson's table of ultimate values is moral and ethical. It reflects
quite as real, pervasive, durable and commendable a marshalling
of priorities as a formal religion. It is just as much a residue of
culture, early training and beliefs shared by companions and fam-

58 50

U.S.C.A. § 462 (1968).
United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968), jurisdiction postponed to
hearing on the merits, 38 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969) (No. 305). United States v.
Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1968); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 520 (D.
Mass. 1968). See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), for a restatement of these findings.
60 United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
6150 U.S.C.A. § 4560) (1968). Subsection (j). PUB. L. 90-40, § 1(7), struck out the provision that religious training and belief stem from the individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relationship, and eliminated the requirement for a hearing by the Department of Justice when
there is an appeal from a local board decision denying conscientious objector status.
Subsection (j) now reads:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject
to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term "religious training and
belief" does not include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views, or
a merely personal moral code.
62 United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
631d. at 911.
64 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1961); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947).
59
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ily. What another derives from the discipline of a church, Sisson
derives from the discipline of conscience. 65
The Seeger case66 was used by this court as a foundation for Sisson's
non-religious claims, although the Seeger case in the Supreme Court
had made it clear that a different problem would be presented if the
petitioner had been an atheist. 67 The reasoning of Judge Wyzanski on
this point was basically unexplained except for his statement that
Seeger had disclosed "wide vistas"6 8 and that "the rationale by which
Seeger and his companions were exempted under the statute is quite
sufficient for Sisson to claim constitutional exemptions." 69 The court
entered the Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and stated in conclusion:
All that this court decides is that as a sincere conscientious objector, Sisson cannot constitutionally be subjected to military orders
(not reviewable in a United States Constitutional Court) which
may require him to kill in the Vietnam conflict. 70
Sisson is now pending before the Supreme Court on motion to affirm
arrest of judgment. 71 However, the force of this particular district court
decision and its future ramifications illustrates the most recent and
direct attack upon the Selective Service Statute's exemption for conscientious objectors. The force of this attack has not been limited to
one geographical area of the nation. The opinion was picked up
quickly by other courts and has met with general approval.
On August 29, 1969, in a Pennsylvania district court, the present
standard of conscientious objector exemption was declared defective in
relation to non-religious claimants. 72 The case involved a petitioner
seeking a discharge from the armed services based on his conscientious
objection to war. The court made clear its feelings on the standard of
"religious training and belief" when it stated:
...

we also hold that the standard of "religious training and belief"

is violative of the First Amendment stricture against the establishment of religion and of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process 73 of law. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902
(1969).
65

United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 905 (D. Mass. 1969).

66 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965).
67 Id.

68 United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 909 (D. Mass. 1969).
69 Id.
70

Id. at 912.

71 United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), jurisdiction postponed to

hearing on the merits, 38 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969) (No. 305).
72 Koster v. Sharp, 303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
73 Id. at 844.
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The court's reasoning was that:
Under the Everson Test,[74] a regulation which makes exemption
from military service dependent upon the applicant's religious
belief, is on its face, defective. Further, a standard which exempts
a religiously motivated conscientious objector from military service and denies the same relief to a person whose beliefs are just
as sincere, but which are not motivated by any relationship to any
religion is constitutionally defective under the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of the due process of law. We concur in Judge Wyzanski's assessment that ". . . it is difficult to imagine any ground for a
statutory distinction except religious prejudice." United States
75
v. Sisson, supra, 297 F. Supp. at page 911.
In the United States District Court of New Jersey on October 21,
1969, another Sisson advocate raised his voice. 76 Like Koster, this was
a situation where a habeas corpus release from the service was desired.
The court granted the release stating:
we view the problem in its narrowest concept, the fundamental
issue involved is the constitutionality of the standard employed by
the legislative classification of conscientious objectors in Section
6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (50 U.S.C.
Append. § 456(j). It is not a mere matter of "accommodation" of
certain religious beliefs. It is, rather, a legislative distinction between those of religious belief and those who are not of any such
persuasion, but who are sincerely convinced that war is morally
wrong, be they atheists or heretics. If the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution do not protect the latter
group by providing due process and equal protection of the laws,
then the legislative standard ignores their right to object to the
killing of their fellowman because they believed it to be wrong on
the basis of abhorrence to any taking of life. The Constitution and
its Amendments never provided for such discriminatory legislation
by Congress. For while one is free to practice his religion under
the First Amendment, he who does not is equally free in the exercise of his election not to do so, and his constitutional rights are
77
not diminished thereby.

...

On November 10, 1969, a United States District Court of Wisconsin
heard the case of James Foran.7 The defendant Foran had refused in74 Everson v. Board of Education, 530 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947) stating
that:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another.
75 Koster v. Sharp, 503 F. Supp. 837, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
76 Goguen v. Clifford, 504 F. Supp. 958 (D. N.J. 1969).
77 1d. at 961.
78 United States

v. Foran, 505 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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duction into the Armed Forces on the basis that he was a conscientious
objector. Foran previously had been denied the conscientious objector
exemption because of the findings by his local board that he was not
religious. 79 The court, in writing its opinion, quoted Sisson extensively
in that Sisson's morality and the defendant Foran's were of the same
nature.8 0 Sisson was then combined with the Shacter8 1 case for the court's
use in drawing the conclusion that:
The fact that the registrant is an atheist does not mean that he
cannot qualify for conscientious objector classification. In both the
Shacter and Sisson cases, registrant atheists were held to be entitled
to conscientious objector classification.8 2
Then interestingly enough, the court continued by using the Supreme
Court's Seeger test 8 3 to draw the finding that:

. . . as a matter of law, that the beliefs of the defendant meet
the Seeger test and that his aversion to war is based on religious
84
training and belief as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The paradox of the Foran8 5 case was that a registrant, self-declared to
be an atheist, was judicially classified as religious enough to come within
the exemption of the statute as defined by the Supreme Court. Query:
Can this mean that courts can consider sincere, self-avowed, atheistic
beliefs as equal to religious beliefs for purposes of conscientious objector exemption?
The above cases demonstrate the various judicial attitudes of lower
courts in finding that the Military Selective Service Act is in discord
with the first and fifth amendments.8 6 However, there is a voice of
79 Id. Defendant stated in effect that objective principles of morality can be deduced
from the order of the universe. One of these axioms is the principle that one should not
kill. He asserted that he did not believe in God, but did not claim absolute certainty for
his belief.
80 Id. at 1326: "'He was as genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience as
would have been a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion.' U.S. v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp.
902, 905 (D. Mass. 1969)."
81 United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968).
82 United States %.'. Foran, 305 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
83 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 85 S. Ct. 850, 859, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733,
743 (1965), stating that:
The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.
84 United States v. Foran, 305 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Wis. 1969). The court stated further: "Foran's belief was in part a product of faith and most certainly occupied the same
place in his life as normal religion occupies in the life of a religious person."
85 United States v. Foran, 305 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
86 United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969); Koster v. Sharp, 303 F.
Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Foran, 305 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Wis. 1969);
Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D. N.J. 1969).
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opposition when the non-religious conscientious objectors have been
granted small favor in other courts of like esteem.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 6, 1969, heard
Negre v. Larsen,87 where an inductee sought a habeas corpus release
from the Armed Services. The petition was denied on the grounds

that Negre's conscientious objector claim was a personal moral code
based on sociological and philosophical views, rather than religious
as required by the statute.88
The court used Sisson in denying the appellant's motion:
Based on United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969),
appellant argues that a denial of conscientious objector classification to him on the ground that his beliefs are purely "personal,"
as opposed to "religious," denies him equal protection of the law.
We believe that Sisson was wrongly decided and decline to follow
it.89

The reasoning of the court in declining to follow the Sisson judgment
is unexplained in its decision; however, the lack of a simple retort can
be seen as a silent momento to the Sisson argument as it lays waiting for
Supreme Court interpretation.
CONCLUSION

2400 years ago the Greek poet Menander wrote, "Conscience is a
God to all mortals." Recent court decisions embracing this principle
indicate that it may become necessary to amend section 456(j) of the
Selective Service Act to preserve the strictures of governmental neutrality demanded by the establishment clause of the first amendment.
87 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969).
88 Id.

89 Id. at 910.
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